Friday, August 3, 2007

Rice Skips, Disarmament Advances at ASEAN Regional Forum

Leon T. Hadar of the CATO Institute observes that Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s decision to “prioritize” Middle East diplomacy over attendance at the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum may tend to marginalize U.S. influence in the region; noting that this is only the second time a U.S. Secretary of State has missed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting since they began in 1994 (the first time was also Secretary Rice in 2005). But the decision may have an unintended consequence for efforts to promote progress toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte did attend and made a proprosal on nonproliferation to the 27 foreign ministers in attendance. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Chris Hill briefed the press yesterday in Manila, saying of ARF nonproliferation efforts that:
“we believe that this is the type of issue for which the ARF is ideally suited -- and we had a very good tete-a-tete on that issue. There are some technical problems that remain, but I’m confident that we can find a resolution. And I think the ARF can make a contribution in this field.”
Abdul Khalik of the Jakarta Post reports a slightly different version from Manila:
“Indonesia on Thursday blocked a U.S. proposal to stop the spread of nuclear weapons during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Manila because it did not include efforts toward disarmament…the U.S. then changed the wording of the proposal, but the proposal was dropped because Indonesia insisted the issue of disarmament must be included.”
Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, who blocked the proposal, explained the connection:
"There's a slightly different approach in the sense that to us nuclear non-proliferation should be seen in the full context, not in separation with other elements, namely disarmament and cooperation on nuclear technology. That's why we suggested that perhaps we should add more elements in the area of cooperation if we're going to develop it in the context of ARF."
Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are organically linked through the international legal rule of sovereign equality embodied in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. These objectives are also legally linked through the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which embodies the global norm of nuclear nonproliferation and binds it explicitly to progress toward the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament in Article VI.

The gentle reminder from our friends in Manila serves the longstanding U.S. interest in enduring nonproliferation and disarmament and hopefully regional cooperation toward these entwined objectives will be strengthened by the exchange (and those observing from the United States will take this important feedback into account in planning for our ongoing efforts toward compliance with Article VI of the NPT). One may wonder if Secretary Rice would have been more successful in swaying her peers than her Deputy was, but we’ll never know because, as Benjamin Disraeli observed, "History is made by those who show up."

2 comments:

  1. Mr. Shaw, I must admit that I find the following passages a bit curious:

    "Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are organically linked through the international legal rule of sovereign equality embodied in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter."

    I'm not sure precisely what you mean by the phrase, "organically linked"; it certainly is not a commonly-used legal phrase. Nor is it clear precisely how the Charter's Article II(1), which itself never expressly mentions "nuclear nonproliferation" or "disarmament," legally (or logically) extends to either.

    I fear that you're assuming implying that non-nuclear-weapon States undertake "nuclear nonproliferation" in return for nuclear-weapon States undertaking "disarmament." If so, I have problems with such reasoning. To begin with, nuclear nonproliferation is something which both NWS and NNWS governments undertake. That is why Articles I and II place reciprocal obligations on both. Moreover, nuclear proliferation is not merely a threat to NWS governments, but also to other NNWS governments.

    You then assert: "These objectives are also legally linked through the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which embodies the global norm of nuclear nonproliferation and binds it explicitly to progress toward the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament in Article VI."

    Compliance with the NPT's Articles I and II is not explicitly bound to, or expressly compelled by, anything within Article VI, a rather vaguely-worded passage of the treaty when compared to, say, Article III. If a State is displeased with the extent to which other States have undertaken with respect to Article VI, then it has every right to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with Article X.

    At any rate, to assert a clear legally-binding obligation with respect to Article VI's relation to the rest of the NPT -- when at most one can assert a politically-binding (which is to say, no legally-binding) obligation -- is not merely disingenuous and ideological, but also legal sophistry.

    -- Anon

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  2. Thank you for your comment and the opportunity to clarify my post.

    My poorly chosen phrase, "organically linked" was meant to emphasize the importance of sovereign equality. I meant to suggest that the NWS and NNWS obligations of the NPT, which are often referred to as "balanced," are politically undermined to the extent that they cannot move toward alignment with the rule of sovereign equality.

    While the argument of "balanced obligations," according to which the NNWS parties undertake nonproliferation in exchange for peaceful uses and disarmament efforts by the NWS parties, is heard quite commonly from well-informed commentators, I do not subscribe to it fully. I have argued elsewhere for movement toward a "fusion of obligations" by which compliance with each article would be understood in an increasingly shared context.

    I do maintain that Article VI remains legally binding and linked to the other articles of the Treaty, despite its ambiguity. The text of the Treaty and the historical experience of the indefinite extension (as reflected in the extension documents) seem to me to make the linkage quite plain. The right to withdraw from the Treaty does not seem to me to undermine the status of the other legal rules it codifies.

    I am grateful for your alternative perspective.

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