Colombia ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Earthtimes reports this morning that Colombia has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) indicates Colombia’s date of ratification as January 29, 2008. Colombia’s ratification brings the total number of ratifications of the Treaty to 144 of 178 that have signed the CTBT.

Following a number of ratifications by smaller states this year, Colombia’s action significantly advances the CTBT toward entry into force as Colombia is one of 44 “Annex 2” states whose ratification is a prerequisite for entry into force.

CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth remarked that:

“This is an extremely important event…Colombia's ratification creates a tipping
point and brings the Treaty one step closer to taking effect. We welcome
Colombia's move and expect other ratifications from Annex 2 countries to follow
suit.”

This bold action by Colombia demonstrates the capacity of all states to contribute to prudent, effective, and verified progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Rosso Jose Serrano Cadena, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Colombia to the CTBTO said that:

Of the 44 “Annex 2” states only North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not yet signed the CTBT and China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States have not yet ratified.

“All peace loving countries must ratify the CTBT…We are sure that this will
happen. Also the Latin American and Caribbean region are now close to becoming a
complete CTBT continent.”

The ratification of Colombia leaves only Cuba, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago not having signed the CTBT and Guatemala not having ratified Treaty among the states parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.

It’s better in the Bahamas!

Acting Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Bahamas T. Brent Symonette made welcoming remarks yesterday to the openning session of a Workshop on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Cooperation for States from the Caribbean Region hosted in Nassau where he announced that:

“As you are aware The Bahamas, signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on 4th February, 2005, and I trust that I will be able to deposit the Instrument of Ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations before the conclusion of this Work-shop.”

Today the International Herald Tribune reports that Prime Minister Symonette has:

“signed the instrument of ratification and sent it to United Nations headquarters, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization said.”

This action makes the Bahamas the 141st state to have ratified the CTBT, following the examples of the Dominican Republic in September (loyal readers will recall our specific encouragement to the Bahamas at that time) and Palau in August. These important steps taken in rapid succession show that even small island states – a category of states that have historically born the brunt of nuclear explosive testing – can assert their sovereignty and exercise international leadership toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

The ratification of the Bahamas leaves only the Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago not having signed the CTBT and Colombia and Guatemala not having ratified Treaty among the states parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Barbados, the eyes of the world are now upon you!

The U.S.-India nuclear deal keeps getting worse for everybody

Last year, Congress passed the Hyde Act, changing thirty-year old U.S. non-proliferation law to make a special exception for India to receive sensitive nuclear technology and material from the United States even though India has repeatedly rejected meaningful nuclear non-proliferation commitments (such as signing the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or ceasing the production of fissile material for weapons purposes in anticipation, as the five nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT have done). The Hyde Act substantially weakened U.S. non-proliferation law, undermined the NPT, and weakened the global norm against nuclear weapons proliferation.

However, the Hyde Act at least ensured that certain minimal non-proliferation conditions, including providing in section 106 that nuclear trade with India must cease if India conducts a nuclear weapon test. India balked at this condition, making sure that it was not included in the “123 agreement” it negotiated with the United States. Under the 123 agreement, it is unclear what the repercussion of an Indian nuclear test would be and subject to interpretation (which the Indians have been quick to use in their favor), and the requirement to cut off nuclear trade is gone.

Recently, NPR’s Steve Inskeep asked Undersecretary Burns about this blatant concession:

STEVE INSKEEP: Let’s talk about skeptics in the United States. You mentioned that Congress voted in support of this deal, but with a lot of conditions. And I wonder whether the negotiations are meeting those conditions. Here’s one. As I understand it, Congress said they want a deal that states that if India ever conducts another nuclear test, this civilian nuclear cooperation ends. Does your current deal do that?

UNDERSECRETARY NICHOLAS BURNS: Yes it does. We have a clear obligation under the Atomic Energy Act to react if a country like India conducts a nuclear test and the President, and any future President will always have that right under our law.

INSKEEP: Just so that I understand, you’ll have the right you say to end nuclear cooperation. Will the United States be required to end nuclear cooperation if there were another test under the agreement that you’ve negotiated so far?

BURNS: Steve, I believe that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the President has the opportunity, the right, that’s how the law is written, and we have protected that right.

INSKEEP: Which means you wouldn’t necessarily end nuclear cooperation and the Indians seem to think that perhaps you wouldn’t.

BURNS: Oh I think it would be up to the American President at the time. But we have been very clear with the Indians that we do not want them to conduct another nuclear test and there is no indication that they have plans to do that any time soon. But protected the right and Congress was absolutely correct in asking us to do this.

INSKEEP: It sounds like you are right at the edge of what you might be able to get through Congress at some point and still you don’t have quite enough to bring Indians on-board.

BURNS: There are a lot of critics of this agreement but there are more people who support it.

Luckily, not in India, where the opposition parties – including the BJP and the Indian Communist party – have delayed the deal threatening to withdraw from Prime Minister Singh’s coalition if Singh goes forward with negotiations for the US-India deal.

However, despite these concessions, less distasteful to the Indian Communists may be a deal with Russia or France or Canada. Russia is already seeking to build four additional reactors at Kudankulam in India.

By making yet additional and dangerous concessions, the Bush Administration has not only further undermined U.S. law and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it has even failed to protect opportunities for American business.

Luckily for nuclear non-proliferation, the deal is still delayed in India.

Three Cheers for the Dominican Republic!

The Associated Press reports (and the website of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization [CTBTO] confirms) that the Dominican Republic has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, becoming the 140th state to have done so. This is particularly great news two weeks ahead of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT (also called Article XIV Conference, which will take place from 17 to18 September 2007 in Vienna, Austria).

Six months ago, the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States held a special meeting celebrating the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Dominican Republic was represented at this meeting commemorating the establishment of the first nuclear weapon-free zone in a populated region. CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth, Randy Rydell of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, President of the Global Security Institute Jonathan Granoff, and Nuclear Age Peace Foundation President David Krieger, and I all spoke to the need for nuclear disarmament progress building on the leadership exhibited by the Tlatelolco signatories. I was very fortunate to have the opportunity to emphasize that:

“your governments should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago have not yet signed and the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala have not yet ratified the Treaty. There is no reason any civilized nation should remain outside the nuclear test ban club. This image depicts the global network of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban’s International Monitoring System, by joining the Treaty, your government contributes to an increasingly respected global norm of nonproliferation and disarmament.”

Coincidence? Almost certainly. But this historic step by the Government of the Dominican Republic to support a legally-binding end to nuclear explosions anywhere underscores the potential in the other nine states mentioned above.

Come on, Bahamas, I know you’ve got it in you!

Palau Steps Up for Disarmament

Palau is asserting its sovereignty in new ways (perhaps as confidence wanes in the value of their 2003 inclusion in the Bush Administration’s “Coalition of the Willing”).

The Associated Press reports that Palau has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), bringing the number of states who have ratified the Treaty to 139.

Also of note, Radio New Zealand International reported on August 1, 2007 that Palau was elected as one of 21 Vice-Presidents of the United Nations General Assembly, the smallest country every to hold that post, according to Marianas Variety. Let’s hope that Palau uses this important moment for small state diplomacy to advance the universality of the CTBT.

If Palau campaigns to bring small states into the CTBT at the General Assembly, they will be successful. More small states ratifying the Treaty would mean less political cover for those that remain outside, advancing the cause of early entry-into-force. In this way, Palau could make a historically disproportionate contribution to international security.

Oh, hello, Mr. Pluto, fancy seeing you twice in a week.

The Associated Press reported on June 7, 2007 that “authorities are investigating how three workers were exposed to radioactive plutonium during environmental restoration work at the Nevada Test Site.”

While the employer of the three contract workers, National Securities Technologies, holds that there is no reason "to believe there were any security or safety considerations here," this seems like a great occasion to reflect on plutonium and human health.

As a fission product, isn’t plutonium basically a man-made element?

The Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment recalls that “Before 1945, plutonium was virtually nonexistent in the human environment. Then in the 1950s and 1960s, plutonium was released into the environment during atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Plutonium can now be found in very small amounts in the soil throughout the Northern Hemisphere because of fallout from the atmospheric testing. Plutonium has also been found in soil near nuclear weapons production plants such as Rocky Flats due to accidents and spills.”

Accidents and spills? Shouldn’t workers be very careful with plutonium?

Len Ackland, Director of the Center for Environmental Journalism at the University of Colorado at Boulder observes on page 112 of his 1999 book Making a Real Killing: Rocky Flats and the Nuclear West that there are at least three reasons to be very careful with plutonium: “First, microscopic particles of radioactive plutonium were extremely toxic if inhaled. Second, a small amount of plutonium – depending on its makeup, shape, and factors such as the presence of water – could create a localized chain reaction called a “criticality,” which could be fatal to anyone within several yards. Third, plutonium metal, especially small chips or filings, was pyrophoric, meaning it could catch fire on its own in the presence of air.”

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency observes that “External exposure to plutonium poses very little health risk, since plutonium isotopes emit alpha radiation, and almost no beta or gamma radiation. In contrast, internal exposure to plutonium is an extremely serious health hazard. It generally stays in the body for decades, exposing organs and tissues to radiation, and increasing the risk of cancer. Plutonium is also a toxic metal, and may cause damage to the kidneys.”

So, safety first, right?

It seems the first Americans to work with plutonium took its dangers, if not in their stride, at least in their stream. Ackland (pps 104-5) recalls the formation of a “UPPU Club” at Los Alamos National Laboratories around 1951, ostensibly for individuals whose urine tested positive for plutonium (UPPU = you pee Pu).

A new facility for plutonium pit production opened at Rocky Flats, Colorado in 1952. The U.S. Department of Energy reminds us that “On June 6, 1989, the Federal Bureau of Investigation raided the Rocky Flats Plant as part of its investigation of allegations of mismanagement, negligence, and criminal practices...Rockwell International, the plant operator at the time, eventually pled guilty to ten counts, including violations of the Clean Water Act, and agreed to pay a fine of $18.5 million.”

Wow, aren’t we lucky that’s over!

Not so fast. According to a June 7, 2007 press release from Nuclear Watch New Mexico, “The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has invited Members of Congress to ‘celebrate’ on July 2 its production of its first certified plutonium trigger (AKA ‘pit’ or ‘primary’) … produced by the U.S. certified for deployment to the nuclear stockpile since 1989.”

So…a party to celebrate the first new plutonium pit certified for deployment to the stockpile since the year the FBI raided and closed the old plutonium pit facility?

I’m sure the July 2 Plutonium Party at LANL will be a glowing celebration, but I don’t think I’d eat anything.

Adding insult to taxpayers to potential for life-threatening injury to workers, as Nuclear Watch Director Jay Coughlin observes, the celebration is “five years late and a billion dollars over budget.”


Some additional plutonium resources:

Dr. Robert Gould, President of the San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of Physicians for Social Responsibility, Plutonium Health Effects: Basics, powerpoint presentation made on October 9, 2004
W. G. Sutcliffe, R. H. Condit, W. G. Mansfield, D. S. Myers, D. W. Layton, and P. W. Murphy, A Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 14, 1995
Plutonium: Human Health Effects Fact Sheet, Argonne National Laboratories, October 2001
The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Fact Sheet on the Physical, Nuclear, and Chemical, Properties of Plutonium
Plutonium on the Internet (from the Nuclear Control Institute)

New Nuclear Weapons are no Bargain

Discussions regarding a modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal through the design and development of a series of “Reliable Replacement Warheads” and the “Complex 2030” plan to create a “responsive infrastructure” for U.S. nuclear weapons production are miscast.

The Bush Administration’s plan to modernize the nuclear arsenal has caused great concern among nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament advocates. New nuclear weapons constitute an area of particularly acute concern for our treaty partners (see groundbreaking work on Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture led by Ambassador Lewis Dunn) and the Bush Administration’s plan leads the world in the wrong direction, toward greater reliance on Cold War weapons and away from progress toward compliance with U.S. obligations under Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Proponents of modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal have responded with the idea of a “grand bargain,” by which these steps to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be matched with deep cuts in the massive overkill capacity of the existing nuclear arsenals left over from the Cold War. While rhetorically appealing, a “grand bargain” sounds a little too familiar to anyone who recalls the history of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and past “bargains” for the ratification of arms control treaties. The U.S. Government has entered into legally binding international commitments to nuclear reductions we have not yet fulfilled and until we can find our way to a global leadership role on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament a “grand bargain” would be hollow. Dr. Michael Krepon points the discussion of nuclear weapons modernization in a more productive direction in a recent article that suggests conditions under which modernizing the nuclear arsenal might be less destabilizing.

Ultimately, creating conditions under which nuclear weapons enhance U.S. national security should not be our objective. National security should be our objective, and to the extent possible it should (and to a large an increasing extent only can) move forward in tandem with global security. Nuclear weapons are the principle threat to U.S. national security and Constitutional democracy. Honest debate is possible about whether present political circumstances and verification capacity empower us to promptly eliminate the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal, but the quality of this debate degrades significantly as we climb back up the nuclear disarmament asymptote to the Bush Administration’s apparent intention to indefinitely retain more than 5,000 deployed and reserve nuclear weapons (as Federation of American Scientists / Natural Resources Defense Council analysis suggests).

Could there be a role for a “safer” nuclear explosive device? Nuclear explosive devices are inherently unsafe so, at best, the answer depends on several factors.

First, it depends on casting the discussion in terms of a real commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. There are several specific steps that we should take on this path immediately: (1) commitment to a new round of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) nuclear weapons reductions negotiations with Russia aimed at a 50% cut below Moscow Treaty levels (1700-2200 deployed nuclear weapons, with no new limit on the number of weapons in reserve) with improvement in verification and compliance measures commensurate with the technical and political possibilities of 2007, (2) multilateralization of these disarmament negotiations to bring in the United Kingdom, France, China, and other states of proliferation concern as well as those concerned with proliferation like Canada, Australia, and Mexico; (3) global zero high-alert negotiations to end the preposterously dangerous Cold War practice of having enough nuclear weapons to wreck the planet available for use within half an hour; (4) the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified by the United States and in force; (5) global fissile material production cutoff discussions well underway; (6) and expansion and integration of nuclear weapon free zones would be a good start.

Second, a reasonable context for the consideration of modernization would also depend on the reaction of our international partners in nonproliferation: nonproliferation only works if the governments of countries believe that it contributes more to their security than nuclear weapons would – a delicate counterintuitive proposition on a good day, but in practice much more valuable to American national security than a few hundred extra nuclear weapons.

Third, it also depends on being sure that we (as a nation) know what we would do with all these nuclear weapons, and I see no indication that this is the case.

Finally, it depends on what we give up to get it – how many more national sacrifice zones, premature deaths, and billions of dollars? What are the medical, public health, and environmental consequences of this course of building new nuclear weapons and what are these new weapons going to cost?

The discussion about a “grand bargain” on the Reliable Replacement Warhead reminds me of the film Groundhog Day in which Bill Murray relives the same day hundreds of times. He learns after a few dozen tries that he can get Andie McDowell to fall in love with him if he exposes her to a certain sequence of romantic experiences. So, the next day, he tries to cram all these romantic experiences into the morning as fast as he can to get to the good stuff – and he totally blows it. Right now, we are totally blowing it by rushing to discuss a “grand bargain” about the Reliable Replacement Warhead rather than undertaking a deliberate, focused, and careful effort to establish the necessary conditions for the discussion.